

file  
JHP  
GB

18 April 1952

TO: Assistant Director  
Office of Collection and Dissemination  
25X1A  
FROM: [REDACTED] Organization and Methods Examiner  
SUBJECT: Final Report - CIA Top Secret Control System

1. PROBLEM:

- a. Development of a uniform Top Secret control system for use throughout CIA to insure the proper degree of control in the most efficient and economical manner;
- b. Solution of control problems unique to certain areas;
- c. Solution of general problems related to Top Secret controls.

2. SURVEY DATES AND AREAS VISITED:

a. Inclusive Survey Dates: 23 January - 16 April 1952

b. Top Secret Control Areas Visited:

- (1) Central Top Secret Control Office, OCD
- (2) Office of Research and Reports
  - (a) Cartographic Branch Sub-Station
- (3) Office of Operations
  - (a) Contact Division Sub-Station
  - (b) [REDACTED] Sub-Station
  - (c) FDD Sub-Station
- (4) Office of National Estimates
- (5) Office of Procurement
- (6) Office of the Comptroller
  - (a) Finance Sub-Station
- (7) Office of Inspection and Security
- (8) Office of Communications
- (9) Office of Personnel
  - (a) Personnel (Covert) Sub-Station
  - (b) Military Personnel Sub-Station
- (10) Office of Training (General)
- (11) Office of Training (Special)
- (12) Administrative Services
  - (a) Records Management Sub-Station
  - (b) Reproduction Sub-Station

STATSPEC

Document No. 3  
NO CHANGE in Class.  
 DECLASSIFIED  
Class: CHANGED TO:  
Auth: DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77  
Date: 21 MAR 1963 By: O22  
DDA REG. 77/1763

Security Information

-2-

- (13) Technical Services Staff
- (14) Office of Policy Coordination - Office of Special Operations
- (15) Office of General Counsel
- (16) Organization and Methods Staff
- (17) Executive Registry

**3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:**

**a. Present Control Systems:**

Control systems vary greatly from area to area. The result is that some areas have limited controls which do not lend themselves to speedy location of documents, efficient follow-up on documents being internally circulated, or strict compliance with security regulations. Other areas have control systems which the examiner considers to be unduly voluminous and cumbersome in the effort to maintain the proper degree of control.

Following are some examples of the variations in controls exercised in the various areas:

(1) Central Top Secret Control maintains a Posting Record on every CIA control number originated in CTSC or appearing on the weekly log of any area, which indicates the movement of each copy number from area to area, and final disposition; a Source card; cover sheets; document receipts, courier receipts; reproduction requisitions; dissemination orders; plus separate card records of material on loan from outside agencies.

(2) At least half of the areas visited depend entirely on the weekly log as their record of documents received, circulated internally, and dispatched to other areas. These logs are maintained in chronological order. Some areas maintain a handwritten log until the end of the week when the log is typed in the requisite number of copies. Document receipts are clipped to the log or signatures are obtained on the area copy of the log. Some areas combine the incoming and outgoing log, other maintain separate logs of incoming and outgoing material. One area maintains 10 separate logs.

(3) Other areas maintain card records which are filed by number, source or subject, and prepare weekly logs only for the purpose of furnishing the required record to Central Top Secret Control.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Security Information

-3-

(4) Within areas there are no systematic controls exercised in Divisions or Branches. Some internal offices use the log form for their internal controls, others use cards, or simply make notes on calendars or notebooks.

(5) Some areas prefer to keep a separate log of documents originated in that area, and enter these documents on the weekly log at the end of the week. Other areas simply make a notation on the block of numbers that the number has been assigned a certain individual, some make a notation in a notebook that a number has been assigned.

(6) OPC - OSO do not send weekly logs to the Central Top Secret Control Office due to the fact that many of the documents received direct from outside agencies or from field stations are of such nature as to prohibit knowledge of these documents outside the immediate area. Records Management Sub-Station of Administrative Services sends copies of their microfilm and vital documents logs to CTSC in lieu of the standard weekly log.

(7) The method of completing the weekly log varies from area to area. Some areas enter internal distribution in the final column of the log form as well as external distribution and/or final disposition of the document. Some areas use the names of individuals rather than areas in listing distribution. Both of these practices make it difficult for CTSC to perform its posting function.

(8) ORR and Reproduction channel their incoming and outgoing documents through separate channels so that follow-up on documents which have a deadline is not systematic.

b. Unique Problems:

(1) ORR, Basic Division is located in [REDACTED] 25X1A6a which is a considerable distance from the Area control office. When Basic Division sends an occasional Top Secret section of an NIS to Reproduction, the section is sent direct to Reproduction rather than being channeled through the Area control office per regulations.

(2) Office of Operations, Contact Division, does not assign a TS control number to teletypes from domestic field stations unless or until they are transmitted outside the Division.

(3) Administrative Services, Records Management Sub-Station, has responsibility for sending analysts and photographers to the various offices of CIA to scan TS documents for selection of those to be microfilmed and filming the documents in the office. The film is then carried back to Records Management for control and filing. These analysts encounter difficulty in convincing CIA offices that they are authorized to have access to such documents.

-4-

(4) Administrative Services, Reproduction Sub-Station, has a security problem in that CIA offices occasionally send members of their own staff to stay with "super-sensitive" documents throughout the reproduction process. A member of the Reproduction staff must remain with the visitor throughout his visit to protect the security of the plant. Such visitors draw attention of the plant workers to the fact that something special is in process.

(5) Certain TS materials are sent to the Technical Services Staff for analysis and the material is usually destroyed or mutilated during the analysis process. The analyst prepares a memorandum report to the requesting office on the findings of the analysis. The Area TSCO requests instructions as to disposition of the cover sheet attached to the destroyed material and proper handling of the memorandum which is frequently not Top Secret in itself.

c. General Problems:

(1) Multiple numbering of documents from outside agencies.-- Every area visited receives documents direct from outside agencies rather than through the Central Top Secret Control Office. Frequently copies of the same document will be sent to two or more areas of CIA. Each area receiving a copy of the document assigns an area 5-digit control number to the copy received. The result is that each copy of the document is controlled by a different CIA control number.

(2) Multiple numbering of actions on the same document.--A document originated in one area or received from an outside agency is frequently sent to other areas for comment or action. Each area assigns its control number to its action on the document. This practice makes it difficult to assemble in one group the complete series of actions on one document.

(3) Lack of complete controls and record copies in Central Top Secret Control Office.--The theory on which a central control office is based is that this central office will have a complete record of every transaction on any given document and that a master file copy of the documents themselves will reside in the central files. Under the present system the CTS defense does not record movement of documents originally controlled by CTS (6-digit numbers) beyond the first CIA recipient. CTS maintains a complete posting record of all Area originated documents (5-digit numbers) but only about 20 per cent of the documents themselves are furnished to the CTS for the central files.

(4) Signature Record and Cover Sheet.--Although Regulation [redacted] states that "Each CIA member who reads or learns the contents of a Top Secret document will sign his name on the cover sheet", this

25X1A

regulation is not observed by a number of CIA officials. In some instances officials have instructed their clerical staff to remove the cover sheet before submitting documents to them.

25X1A

(5) Hand-carrying of documents without recourse to control channels.--Hand-carrying of TS documents by officials from area to area without recourse to the Area control office is prevalent throughout CIA. This practice also extends to outside agencies. Regulation [redacted] states, "The CIA Top Secret Control Officer and Area and Alternate Top Secret Control Officers are the only persons who shall be permitted to transmit and receipt for Top Secret material moving between CIA and outside agencies."

25X1A

(6) Authority vested in Assistant Top Secret Control Officers.-- Regulation [redacted] Section L.(9) infers that Assistant Top Secret Control Officers are authorized to transmit and receipt for documents moving anywhere within CIA. The Top Secret Guide which is furnished to Areas states that, ".....a limited number of Assistants to provide for the security of TS documents dispatched internally to various sub-divisions of the office....He may release a document for transmittal to another Assistant within his Area." The apparent conflict between these instructions has resulted in confusion in the areas; hence, in some areas assistants are authorized to transmit and receipt for documents from other areas. This practice prevents the proper degree of control in the Area TSCO.

(7) Authority to see Top Secret documents.--Regulation [redacted] states that,"Office heads are responsible for the designation of persons in their offices...whom they deem are operationally required to see Top Secret material..."Area control officers state that they are not furnished with up-to-date lists of persons authorized to see.

25X1A

25X1A

(8) Over-classification.--Although some progress has been made toward overcoming the tendency toward over-classification, the examiner has found indications that at least 50 per cent of documents classified Top Secret should bear a lower classification. This survey was limited to control offices so that information on this subject is limited; however, in only one area was evidence found that an objective review is made of classifications as directed in Regulation [redacted]

(9) Physical security of Top Secret documents.--Bindings of Top Secret documents which are not issued in the form of publications are not sufficiently secure in that the cover page and the last page are of the same flimsy material as the remainder of the document and the pages are stapled together. Frequent handling results in pages being torn completely away or mutilated.

(10) Officer-courier schedules.--Inasmuch as all Top Secret documents must be transmitted by officer-courier, it would be helpful if each Area could be furnished with an up-to-date officer-courier schedule.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

-6-

(11) Destruction of documents and waste.--Location of many offices at a considerable distance from "M" Building where all Top Secret material must be destroyed imposes a hardship on the areas as to transportation and sufficient time. Also, Regulation [REDACTED] states that, "Preliminary drafts, copies, carbons, stencils, stenographic notes, work sheets, and the like, pertaining to classified matter of full classifications, will be torn or shredded into small pieces, and placed in envelopes or other receptacles conspicuously marked 'SECRET'." The examiner believes that intelligible Top Secret waste should not be included with Secret waste.

25X1A

(12) Unnumbered TS documents.--Occasionally an area will receive an unnumbered document from another area and will assign a control number. In some instances these documents are still in draft form.

(13) Inventory of TS documents.--Inventory of TS documents has been implemented in only one area to the knowledge of the examiner. This inventory covered 50,000 documents and was completed over a period of seven months as an additional duty to the regular duties of the area control office.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Control System:

(1) Establishment of Uniform Control System:

(a) A uniform control system should be established throughout CIA which would include instructions for control of documents from the highest to lowest echelon. These instructions should be issued in the form of Procedures Manual which would outline in detail the regulations to be complied with, the forms to be used, the channels of control, etc.

Security Information

-7-

(b) The following control system is proposed by the examiner for consideration. It is considered practical and feasible for use by all areas and the Central Top Secret Control Office.

<u>Source</u>	<u>CIA Control No.</u>			
<u>Subject</u>	<u>Copy Number (s)</u>			
<u>Document Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of Pages</u>	<u>Received from</u>	<u>Date</u>
<u>Attachments</u>	<u>Enclosures</u>		<u>Dispatched to</u>	<u>Date</u>
<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>Internal Routing</u>	<u>Signature</u>	<u>Date and Time Out</u>	<u>Date and Time In</u>

(c) The above card would be prepared in quadruplicate for every transaction in which a document is originated by an Area, transmitted from an Area to another Area, or transmitted to an outside agency. This card would also be prepared on any document received from an outside agency. The card would be a snap-out type with carbon interleaved and each copy would be a different color. One copy of the card would be sent to Central Top Secret Control Office at the end of the week indicating "Received from" and "Date." One additional copy would be held by the area until the document is transmitted elsewhere, then completed as to "Dispatched to" and "Date" and forwarded to CTSCO at the end of the week in which this transaction took place. If the document is received and transmitted within the same week, both copies of the card would go forward to CTSCO at the same time. CTSCO would file one copy of the card by control number and the other copy by source.

(d) One copy of the card would be filed by the source and one copy by source. The source file may be further broken down by subject if desired.

(2) Advantages:

(a) This control card would replace (i) the Posting Record now maintained by Central Top Secret Control Office on all CIA control numbers, which is obtained by transfer of information from weekly logs to a Posting Record Card, (ii) the Source card which is intellofaxed for Central TSCO on all CIA control numbers, (iii) the weekly log prepared by areas, (iv) the various other records maintained by areas, which are necessary under the present system to facilitate ready location of documents or records.

(b) The control card could be flagged with colored tabs for use in follow-up on documents which must move out of an area by a deadline date, follow-up on return of signed document receipts.

(c) Central TSCO would have a complete record of all transactions on both 6-digit and 5-digit numbers though the actual amount of work necessary in CTSCO to obtain these complete records would be preparation of the control cards on documents which are received in CTSCO for transmission to areas and/or Reproduction.

(d) The space on the lower half of the card would enable areas to have on the one card a record of internal routing as well as transmission and dispatch to other areas. The space on the lower half also permits space for signatures of personnel within the area who receive the document.

(e) Use of the control card would enable areas to maintain in a separate block the cards on all documents originated by the area.

(f) Document receipts could be made in single copy only and the card flagged that a signed receipt is due to be returned. The returned receipts could be filed immediately back of the control card.

(g) The control card provides ample space for listing of internal dissemination whereas the log form does not provide space for internal dissemination.

(h) The proposed control card is the size of the IBM card. Thus, file cabinets for the control cards can be easily obtained.

(i) The proposed control card provides for listing of all the information that areas and CTSCO are presently listing regarding any document.

(j) Use of the proposed control card would enable those areas which handle sensitive material, information on which should not be sent outside the area, to readily separate those cards from cards dealing with material of general knowledge and send the appropriate cards to the CTSCO.

(k) Use of the proposed control card would facilitate future inventories of documents.

(3) Disadvantages:

The examiner believes that the only disadvantage inherent in the proposed system is that, whereas the present Posting Record of CTSCO incorporates on one card all transactions on any one document of the 5-digit series, the proposed system will require a separate card for each transaction. However, it is believed that this one disadvantage is far outweighed by the many advantages. After a given period of time all cards on a document can be retired except the card on each copy number indicating its final disposition.

b. Unique Problems:

The unique problems outlined under Section 3,b. can be handled on an individual basis with the areas concerned and appropriate action will be recommended under Section 4,b.

c. General Problems:

(1) Multiple numbering of documents from outside agencies.-- It is considered impractical from the standpoint of control and efficient operations to have documents trickling in to the various areas direct from outside agencies. Any document which is of interest to more than one area should be controlled originally by the Central TSCO in order that this office can be, in fact, the central source of information on any document of general interest. Also, many documents from outside agencies are received in single copy and must be reproduced for CIA purposes. Central TSCO has the facilities for obtaining rapid reproduction of such documents. It is also in a position to obtain a valid estimate of CIA requirements.

It is recognized that this problem of areas receiving documents direct can never be completely overcome inasmuch as documents are sometimes handed to officials in meetings or the urgency of the matter necessitates the most direct approach. However, exceptional treatment for such documents is recommended in Section 4, c.(1).

(2) Multiple numbering of actions on the same document.-- Recommendation for correction of this problem is proposed in Section 4, c. (2).

-10-

(3) Lack of complete controls and record copies in Central TSCO.--Use of the proposed control system would complete the records of Central TSCO. It is believed that it would be of considerable value to CIA to have record copies of documents in the Central files. It could be a function of the areas to determine which documents are of general interest and send a copy of the document to Central TSCO when the control card goes forward. To keep the files of the Central TSCO as small as possible, such documents could be micro-filmed and the copy returned to the area.

(4) Signature Record and Cover Sheet.--This appears to be an instance where the regulation should be either enforced or revoked. It is beyond the authority of area control officers to enforce this regulation if officials are unwilling to observe it. This seems to be a matter for review by the Office of Inspection and Security.

(5) Hand-carrying of documents.--Every area visited by the examiner seems to make every possible effort to obtain the cooperation of the staff in the observance of channels. The answer to this problem seems to be the full support and cooperation of Office heads in impressing upon their staff the importance of control channels and enforcement of punitive measures to correct defaults.

(6) Authority of Assistant Top Secret Control Officers.--The examiner believes that the regulation should be revised to state plainly that assistants are authorized to transmit and receipt for documents only within their own immediate Division or Branch. Any movement of a document between Divisions or outside the Area should be channeled through the Area TSCO.

(7) Authority to see.-- Office heads should be reminded of their responsibility in this respect and should designate someone to inform the Area TSCO and assistants as to the names of such individuals and maintain current lists.

(8) Over-classification.--To overcome the problem of over-classification of documents by the originator, it is recommended that Office heads should designate a limited number of persons in the various divisions and staff offices to review objectively each document originated in that office, for the purpose of disapproval or approval of a classification of Top Secret or Secret proposed by the originator. These individuals should also review periodically all Top Secret or Secret documents originated by that Office to determine whether that classification is still valid. The reviewer should be thoroughly indoctrinated by the Office of Inspection and Security as to the criteria to be applied in determining the proper classification.

-11-

(9) Unnumbered TS documents.--The examiner believes that any document, as soon as it evolves into intelligible form, should be assigned a control number because the material therein is Top Secret regardless of the form. When a draft is being circulated from area to area for comment or action, it is very difficult to maintain a proper degree of control without a control number. The present practice of assigning the control number of one area to a draft prepared by another area leads to confusion.

(10) After review of the problems involved in conducting an inventory of all documents from the inception of CIA to the present, the examiner believes that inventory should be started with all documents from January 1, 1950, through June 30, 1952. Thereafter, a quarterly inventory should be taken in each area. Report of results of inventories should be provided to the CIA Top Secret Control Officer within fifteen days after the cut-off date of the period covered by inventory. The first inventory will be the most difficult and should be initiated at the earliest possible date. Each area should be responsible for all documents (all copies thereof) originated by the area plus all documents received direct from outside agencies. Central Top Secret Control would be responsible for accounting for all documents bearing a 6-digit control number. If the proposed control system is adopted, Central Top Secret Control would be responsible after June 30, 1952, for initiating the quarterly inventory and requesting an accounting from the areas for all documents not recorded in the Central TSCO.

5. ACTION RECOMMENDED:

a. Installation of Uniform Control System:

- (1) Meeting with all Area Top Secret Control Officers to discuss the proposed uniform control system.
- (2) Preparation of a Procedures Manual outlining in detail:
  - (a) Regulations to be complied with;
  - (b) Each step of the control procedure to be performed by Central TSCO, Area TSCO's, Sub-Stations, Divisions, Branches, etc.;
  - (c) Forms to be used;
  - (d) Annexes which are removable--listing all Alternate and Assistant Top Secret Control Officers, all persons authorized to see Top Secret material, persons designated to review classifications, persons authorized to hand-carry material outside the Agency, officer-courier schedules, arrangements for destruction.
- (3) Periodic visits to each area by the CIA or Central Top Secret Control Officer to review the problems of the area.

-12-

b. Unique Problems:

- (1) ORR, Basic Division should become a Sub-Station to facilitate handling of Top Secret sections of NIS.
- (2) Office of Operations, Contact Division, should assign a TS control number to teletype [REDACTED] and 25X1A execute a control card.
- (3) Administrative Services, Records Management Sub-Station, should be provided by the Office of Inspection and Security with special passes for analysts and photographers to use when visiting offices to microfilm TS documents. These passes should be controlled by the Area TSCO and retained in that office except when in use by analysts and photographers.
- (4) In order to cut down the number of visitors to Reproduction who accompany documents through processing, it is recommended that clearances could be obtained for the Reproduction TS control officer and the Production Coordinator to handle certain extra-sensitive materials. The Production Coordinator is capable of operating the various machines in the plant and could personally process such material.
- (5) Analysts in the Technical Services Staff should execute the destruction certificate at the bottom of the Signature Record and Cover Sheet when TS material is destroyed by analysis. The memorandum report, regardless of the classification, should be attached to the cover sheet for return to the office of origin.

c. General Problems:

- (1) Multiple Numbering of documents from outside agencies.-- CIA Top Secret Control Officer should request all outside agencies to send all Top Secret material through the Central Top Secret Control Office. Exceptions could be made for "eyes only" and other sensitive materials. In the case of exceptions, the area receiving the document direct should call the Central TSCO for a 6-digit control number. Central TSCO would place a control card in suspense until further information would be submitted at the end of the week by the area.
- (2) Multiple number of actions on the same document.--A control number should be assigned by the originating CIA area. All actions taken by other areas should bear the same control number followed by a dash and the office symbol, for example, 43567-00. If the same document returns to 00 for a second action the symbol would be 43567-00.2.

Security Information

-13-

(3) Lack of complete controls and record copies in Central TSCO.--Adoption of the proposed control system and submission of record copies of documents to Central TSCO are recommended.

(4) Signature Record and Cover Sheet.--It is recommended that the Office of Inspection and Security should be requested to review use of the cover sheet and either insure enforcement of the regulation or revoke same.

(5) Hand-carrying of documents.--It is recommended that the Office of Inspection and Security should be requested to instruct Office Heads to designate certain officials to be authorized to hand-carry documents to outside agencies. Office Heads should be requested also to give their full support to the observance of control channels through the media of periodic memoranda to their staff and verbal reminders in staff meetings.

25X1A

(6) Authority vested in Assistant Top Secret Control Officers.--It is recommended that Regulation [REDACTED] should be revised to restrict Assistant TSCO's to transmitting and receipting for documents only within their immediate areas (Divisions, Branches, staff offices).

(7) Authority to see.--Office Heads should review periodically the lists of persons authorized to see Top Secret documents and issue a memorandum as to revisions to the Area TSCO and the Central TSCO.

(8) Over-classification.--Office Heads should be instructed to designate a limited number of persons in the various divisions and staff offices to review objectively each document which the originator has classified Top Secret or Secret. The reviewer should be thoroughly indoctrinated by the Office of Inspection and Security as to the criteria to be applied in determining proper classifications.

(9) Physical security of Top Secret documents.--It is recommended that each Top Secret document should be backed by a thick backing sheet on which only the classification and the document control number would appear. The documents should be stapled at least twice both front and back.

(10) Officer-courier schedules.--Schedules should be furnished to each Area TSCO and kept current.

Security Classification:

-14-

25X1A



(12) Inventory of documents from 1 January 1950, through 30 June 1952, should be initiated immediately. Thereafter, quarterly inventories should be initiated by the Central Top Secret Control Office.

25X1A9a



CONCURRENCES:

  
CIA Top Secret Control Officer

25X1A9a

  
W. L. Peel  
Chief, Organization and Methods Service